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SUPREME COURT REVIEW
FIRST AMENDMENT

-

NONOBSCENE

CHILD PORNOGRAPHY AND ITS
CATEGORICAL EXCLUSION FROM
CONSTITUTIONAL
PROTECTION
New York v. Ferber, 102 S. Ct. 3348 (1982).
I.

INTRODUCTION

In New York v. Ferber,I the Supreme Court upheld a New York criminal statute 2 which prohibited the distribution of material that visually
depicts sexual conduct or the lewd exhibition of genitals by children
3
under sixteen years of age, when such material is not legally obscene.
Prior to Ferber, the first amendment required a finding of legal obscenity
before sexually explicit speech could be prohibited on the basis of content. 4 The Court broke with precedent 5 in the instant case, however,
and classified nonobscene depictions of children's sexuality as a new category of speech which, like obscenity, receives no first amendment protection. 6 Because the state has a "compelling interest in prosecuting
those who promote the sexual exploitation of children," 7 and because
the Court felt that this interest was not adequately reflected in the legal
1 102 S. Ct. 3348 (1982).
2 N.Y. PENAL LAW §263.00 (McKinney 1977).
3 The standard for determining whether speech is obscene, and thus outside the protection of the first amendment, was enunciated by the Supreme Court in Miller v. California,
413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973): "A state [obscenity] offense must also be limited to works which,
taken as a whole, appeal to the prurient interest in sex, which portray sexual conduct in a
patently offensive way, and which, taken as a whole, do not have serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value."
4 See Pinkus v. United States, 436 U.S. 293 (1978); Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188
(1977); Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974); Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87
(1974); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
5 For a discussion of the Court's misuse of precedent, see infra notes 105-124 and accompanying text.
6 Ferber, 102 S.Ct. at 3357.
7 Id. at 3356.
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definition of obscenity set forth in Miller v. Caliform'a,8 the Court held:
The test for child pornography is separate from the obscenity standard. . . . A trier of fact need not find that the material appeals to the
prurient interest of the average person; it is not required that sexual conduct portrayed be done so in a patently offensive manner; and the material
at issue need not be considered as a whole. 9

This Note will examine the precedents and justifications used by
the Court in removing nonobscene child pornography from the protection of the first amendment. It will also discuss the significance of the
Court's willingness to place a new category of expression beyond the
realm of constitutional protection without a requirement that the trier
of fact consider the value of the material taken as a whole.
II.

HISTORY

In 1977, the United States Congress and the national media exposed the exploitation of children by pornographers as a national problem.' 0 The New York legislature responded to the problem by enacting
article 263 of its penal law," which classifies the use of a child in a
sexual performance as a class D felony:1 2 "A person is guilty of promoting a sexual performance' 3 by a child when, knowing the character and
8 413 U.S. 15. See supra note 3, infra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
9 Ferber, 102 S. Ct. at 3358.
10 The widespread use of children in pornography is a relatively new phenomenon:
"Child pornography as a big business began with the importation of such material from Europe about 18 months ago. The child magazines and films quickly became big sellers in adult
bookshops and American pornographers, alert to a good business opportunity, rushed into the
market." Sneed, Bliss and Moslely, Child Pornography: Sicknessfor Sale, Chi. Tribune, May 15,
1977, at I, col. 1, reprinted in Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation: Hearings before the
Subcomm. to InvestigateJuvenile Delinquency of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciag, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 130 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings]. The discovery of the problem led to
many investigative reports. See, e.g., Anson, The Last Porno Show, NEw TIMES, June 24, 1977,
at 46, reprintedin Senate Hearings, supra, at 130; Child's Garden of Perversity, TIME, Apr. 4, 1977,
at 55, reprinted in Senate Hearings, supra, at 121; Child Pornography: Outrage Starts to Stir Some
Action, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., June 13, 1977, at 66; Densen-Gerber, What Pornographers
are Doing to Children. A Shocking Report, REDBOOK, Aug. 1977, at 86; Kiddie Porn, CBS 60
Minutes, vol. IX, No. 33 [broadcast May 17. 1977], reprintedin Senate Hearings, supra, at 123.
H The New York legislative declaration reads as follows:
The legislature finds that there has been a proliferation of exploitation of children as
subjects in sexual performance. The care of children is a sacred trust and should not be
abused by those who seek to profit through a commercial network based upon the exploitation of children. The public policy of the state demands the protection of children
from exploitation through sexual performances.
N.Y. PENAL LAW §263.00 (McKinney 1977).
12 Class D felonies carry a maximum punishment of up to seven years for an individual,
and a fine up to $10,000 for corporations. N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 70.00, 80.10 (McKinney 1975).
13 "Sexual performance" means any performance or part thereof which includes sexual
conduct by a child less than sixteen years of age. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 263.00(1) (McKinney
1977).
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content thereof, he produces, directs, or promotes1 4 any performance' 5
which includes sexual conduct by a child less than sixteen years of
age.' 6 Sexual conduct is defined as "actual or simulated sexual intercourse, deviate sexual intercourse, sexual beastiality, masturbation,
sado-masochistic abuse, or lewd exhibition of the genitals."'1 7 This statute lacks an obscenity requirement, and since another section of the penal law' 8 prohibits obscene sexual performances involving children, "[i]f
section 263.15 serves any independent purpose, its goal must be to pro'20
9
hibit nonobscene sexual performances' involving children.
The instant case arose when Paul Ferber, the proprietor of a Manhattan bookstore, sold an undercover police officer two films devoted
almost exclusively to depictions of young boys masturbating. Ferber
was indicted on two counts of promoting an obscene sexual performance
by a child, and two counts of promoting a sexual performance by a
child. 2' A jury acquitted Ferber of the obscenity charge, but found him
22
guilty under section 263.15, which does not require proof of obscenity.
Ferbers's conviction was affirmed without opinion by the Appellate Di23
vision of the New York State Supreme Court.
The New York Court of Appeals reversed, however, declaring the
14 "Promote" means to procure, manufacture, issue, sell, give, provide, lend, mail, deliver,

transfer, transmute, publish, distribute, circulate, disseminate, present, exhibit, or advertise,
or to offer or agree to do the same. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 263.00(5) (McKinney 1977).
15 "Performance" means any play, motion picture, photograph, or dance. Performance
also means any other visual representation exhibited before an audience. N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 263.00(4) (McKinney 1977).
16 Id. § 263.15 (McKinney 1977).
17 d. § 263.00(3) (McKinney 1977).
18 Id. § 263.10 (McKinney 1977) states: "A person is guilty of promoting an obscene sexual performance by a child when, knowing the character and content thereof, he produces,
directs, or promotes any obscene performance which includes sexual conduct by a child less
than sixteen years of age."
19 New York is one of twenty states which prohibit the sale of nonobscene child pornography. See ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. §13-3553 (Supp. 1981); COLO. REV. STAT. §18-6-403 (Supp.
1981); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 1108, 1109 (1979); FLA. STAT. § 847.014 (1976); HAWAII
REV. STAT. §707-751 (Supp. 1981); Ky. REv. STAT. §§ 531.320, 531.340-.360 (1980); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:8 1.1 (A)(3) (West Supp. 1982); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 272, § 29A
(West Supp. 1982); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.145c(3) (1982); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-5-33(4)
(Supp. 1981); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-625 (1981); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2C:24-4(b)(5) (1981);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 21 § 1021.2 (Supp. 1981-1982); PA. CONS. STAT. § 6312(c) (1982); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 11-9-1.1 (1981); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 9, § 43.25 (Vernon 1982); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-10-1206.5(3) (Supp. 1981); W. VA. CODE § 61-8C-3 (Supp. 1981); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 940.203(4) (West Supp. 1981-1982).
20 People v. Ferber, 52 N.Y.2d 674, 678, 422 N.E.2d 523, 525, 439 N.Y.S.2d 863, 865
(1981) (per curiam).
21 Id. at 677, 422 N.E.2d at 524, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 864.
22 People v. Ferber, 96 Misc.2d 669, 409 N.Y.S.2d 632 (1978).
23 People v. Ferber, 62 A.D. 558, 424 N.Y.S.2d 967 (1980).
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statute to be unconstitutional. 24 In holding that the statute violated the

first amendment, the court stated:
[Oin its face the statute would prohibit the showing of any play or movie
in which a child portrays a defined sexual act, real or simulated, in a nonobscene manner. It would also prohibit the sale, showing, or distributing
of medical or educational materials containing photographs of such acts.

Indeed, by its terms, the statute would prohibit those who oppose such
portrayals from providing illustrations of what they oppose. In short, the
statute would in many, if not all, cases prohibit the promotion of materials
which are traditionally entitled to constitutional protection from govern25
ment interference under the First Amendment.
In essence, the court's primary criticism was that the statute swept protected expression within its ambit, and was therefore unconstitutionally
26
overbroad.
The court of appeals also criticized the statute for being underinclusive. Although the state's purpose was to protect the welfare of minors, the court questioned the nexus between this purpose and the
means chosen since the statute did not prohibit the distribution of all
films in which a child was required to engage in any of the other activities which the legislature has determined to be dangerous to children,
such as the performance of a dangerous stunt.2 7 Citing Erznoznik v. City
ofJacksonviie 28 for support, the court therefore held that section 263.15
could not be sustained because it discriminated against visual portrayals
24 People v. Ferber, 52 N.Y.2d 674, 422 N.E.2d 523, 439 N.Y.S.2d 863 (1981)(per curiam).
25 Id. at 678, 422 N.E.2d at 525, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 865. Judge Jasen, who dissented, dis-

agreed with the majority's interpretation of the statute and with the majority's assessment
that the statute could not be more narrowly construed. He thought the statute need not be
read so broadly as to include socially beneficial material, but could instead be construed to
reach only "sexually exploitive materials." Id. at 687, 422 N.E.2d at 530, 439 N.Y.S.2d at
870. (Jasen, J., dissenting).
26 The court listed the statute's prohibition of materials produced outside of New York as
another reason for holding that the statute would punish protected speech. The court noted
that some material may contain depictions of sexual activity by children which is considered
normal in the children's culture, such as a filmed report of New Guinea fertility rites. Ferber,
52 N.Y.2d at 680, 422 N.E.2d at 526, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 866. Because such a report would be
banned even though the children's acts are not illegal where the film is produced, and because such a report does not involve exploitation, the statute would, in effect, ban protected
material while serving no state interest. Further, the court doubted whether New York possessed the police power to regulate sexual performances of children produced outside the
state. Id.
27 Id.
28 422 U.S. 205 (1975). In Erznoznik, the Supreme Court did not allow the City of Jacksonville to justify its ban of outdoor movies containing nonobscene nudity on the basis of
preventing traffic accidents:
By singling out movies containing even the most fleeting and innocent glimpses of nudity
the legislative classification is strikingly underinclusive. There is no reason to think that
a wide variety of other scenes in the customary screen diet, ranging from soap opera to
violence, would be any less distracting to the passing motorist.
Id. at 214-15.
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of nonobscene adolescent sex and 55no justification has been shown for
the distinction other than special legislative distaste for this type of
29
portrayal,
The court concluded its opinion by emphasizing that striking down
section 263.15 would not leave children unprotected. "Those who employ children in obscene plays, films and books, are still subject to prosecution as are those who sell or promote such materials. ....
'"30 While
recognizing the state's compelling interest in protecting children from
sexual exploitation,3 t the court refused to recognize a close connection
between this interest and the prohibition of nonobscene depictions of
child sexuality.32 The court apparently decided that harmful exploitation could be prevented by regulating obscene material, and that such
33
an approach was required in order to protect first amendment rights.
Judge Jasen dissented. According to him, section 263.15 did not
restrict the exchange of ideas concerning teenage sexuality; it merely
eliminated one mode of expression available to a speaker in exploring
the topic by prohibiting the use of children in depictions.3 4 Therefore,
Judge Jasen would have upheld the statute under the test enunciated by
the United States Supreme Court in United States v. O'Bren.35 Moreover,
29

Ferber, 52 N.Y.2d at 681, 422 N.E.2d at 526, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 866.

30 Id. at 681, 422 N.E.2d at 526, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 866-67.

31 Id. at 679, 422 N.E.2d at 525-26, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 866.
32 Id. at 681, 422 N.E.2d at 526, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 866-67.
33 The court attempted to interpret the statute in a manner which avoided constitutional
infirmities, but found that "it is not possible to save section 263.15 by limiting its application
to those who promote obscene performances." Id. at 678-79, 422 N.E.2d at 525, 439 N.Y.S.2d
at 865. Apparently, the court felt that nonobscene depictions could not be prohibited because
such depictions fall under the protective reach of the first amendment.
34 Id. at 684, 422 N.E.2d at 528, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 868-69 (Jasen, J., dissenting). Judge
Jasen was apparently contending that the statute is merely a reasonable time, place, or manner restriction. For a discussion of this viewpoint, see infra note 143.
35 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1967). The O'Brien test holds that:
a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of
the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to
the furtherance of that interest.
This test is used to determine whether a governmental interest is important enough to justify
regulation of conduct, when that regulation produces incidental limitations on first amendment rights. Id. at 376.
The O'Brien test should not be applied to section 263.15. That section fails the third part
of the O'Brien test because it is content-based and thus not unrelated to the suppression of free
expression. As Professor Nimmer explains, statutes which purport to regulate communicative
conduct fail the third section of the O'Brien test when they regulate conduct in contexts which
differ only in their communicative potential from contexts in which the conduct is not regulated. Nimmer, The Meaning ofSympoblic Speech Underthe FirstAmendment, 21 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
29, 39-41 (1973). Section 263.15 regulates the sexual exploitation of children, the conduct
which the government is interested in preventing, only when that conduct is captured in a
depiction with communicative potential. Further, to the extent that section 263.15 serves the
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he reasoned that even if the statute was a restriction on content, as the
majority contended, and was therefore subject to the strictest standards
of scrutiny
the State's interest in protecting children is so compelling that even a direct restraint would be permissible. .

.

. [T]here is a "clear and present

danger" that the promotion of a "sexual performance" by a child will
bring about the substantive
evil--child abuse-ivhich the Legislature has
36
a right to prevent.
Judge Jasen proceeded on the assumption that the concept of obscenity has no place in a statute directed at child pornography. He reasoned that obscenity statutes are concerned with the effect which
obscene material has upon the community, while child pornography
statutes are concerned with preventing the child abuse which is inherent
in the production of such materials. 37 Because these statutes are concerned with protecting different state interests, Judge Jasen assumed
that obscenity statutes would fail to cover all instances of sexual child
government's interest in protecting children from invasions of privacy which occur when nonobscene depictions of child sexuality are distributed, see infra notes 79-80 and accompanying
text, the government interest in suppressing these depictions is related solely and directly to
their use as a means of communication and is unrelated to regulation of conduct. The O'Brien
test is inapplicable when "the communication allegedly integral to the conduct is itself
thought to be harmful." O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 382.
36 Ferber, 52 N.Y.2d at 686, 422 N.E.2d at 530, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 870 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
The clear and present danger test, introduced by Justice Holmes in Schenck v. United States,
249 U.S. 47 (1919), has been used to separate constitutionally protected advocacy from unprotected incitement of violent or illegal conduct. See, e.g., City of Madison Joint School Dist.
No. 8 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167, 173-74 (1976); Hess v.
Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108-09 (19 7 3)(per curiam); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296,
308 (1940). But see Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 563 (1976) (applying clear
and present danger test to fair trial-free press problem). The clear and present danger test
was restated in its present form in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), where the
Court held that government may not prohibit advocacy of illegal or dangerous acts "except
where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely
to incite or produce such action." Id. at 447 (footnote omitted). The purpose of the clear and
present danger test is not to suppress speech which is regarded as evil in itself. It is to suppress
speech which, by its force, is capable of inciting an immediate evil. "Only that evil which is
so imminent as to come to fruition before it can be absorbed and considered in open debate
may be prohibited." Torke, Some Notes on the Proper Uses of the Clear and Present Danger Test,
1978 B.Y.U.L. REV. 1, 35.
Properly formulated, the clear and present danger test does not apply to child pornography. The Ferber Court explained that the sale of child pornography encourages child abuse
by providing profits to the producers to abuse children, leading these producers to create
more child pornography. Ferber, 102 S. Ct. at 3357. But this is a slow process, not an immediate one. Further, the sale of child pornography is not directed at inciting child abuse; it is
directed at inciting a sexual response in deviants. The clear and present danger test could be
properly used to prohibit child pornography if the Court found that child pornography is
directed to and has the effect of inciting deviants to molest children; this possibility, however,
was never discussed by the Court.
37 Ferber, 52 N.Y.2d at 682-83, 422 N.E.2d at 527, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 867 (Jasen, J.,
dissenting).
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abuse, and that therefore, a separate child pornography statute was
needed.3 8 The majority, on the other hand, proceeded on the assumption that the guidelines of Miller constituted the appropriate border separating protected from unprotected material in the context of a child
pornography statute.3 9 The Supreme Court, while admitting that "the
Court of Appeals' assumption was not unreasonable in light of our decisions," 40 reversed the decision and held that the statute is
41
constitutional.
III.

THE SUPREME COURT

Justice White's majority opinion 42 removed all works which contain a sexual performance by a child, as defined by New York Penal
Law section 263.15, from first amendment protection. The Court employed a balancing test in reaching this result; the state's "compelling
interest" in protecting children from sexual exploitation was weighed
against the "de mintmrs" first amendment interest in allowing the distri-

43
bution of depictions of children's sexual activity.

After noting that the dangers to the physical and emotional wellbeing of child pornography participants are well documented, 44 the
38 Id. (Jasen, J., dissenting). Judge Jasen implied that child pornography receives less
protection than obscenity because the state's interest in eradicating child pornography is,
perhaps, more compelling than its interest in eradicating obscenity. See id. at 685-686, 422

N.E.2d at 529, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 869 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
39 Id. at 678, 422 N.E.2d at 525, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 863.
40 Ferber, 102 S. Ct. at 3352. Several commentators had predicted that when child pornography laws which lacked an obscenity requirement were brought before the Court, they
would be found unconstitutional. See, e.g., Comment, Preying on Playgrounds: The Sexploitation
of Children in PornographyandProstitution, 5 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 809, 824-36 (1978)(child por-

nography statutes regulate a form of free speech, and without an obscenity requirement
"[s]uch sweeping legislative prohibitions fall desperately short of the Miller standards and are
clearly overbroad." Id. at 828); Note, ChildPornography: A New Role for the Obscenity Doctrine,

1978 U. ILL. L.F. 711, 740-42 ("New York's rejection of the obscenity doctrine appears patently unconstitutional." Id. at 743-44). Contra Comment, Protection of Children From Use in
Pornography: TowardConstitutionalandEnforceableLegislation, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 295, 306-33

(1978)("failure to provide an obscenity requirement does not violate the first amendment,
provided that explicit sexual conduct is defined only to include conduct certain to harm the
child victim." Id. at 334).
41 In reaching this result, the Court failed to make use of either the clear and present
danger test or the O'Brien standard used by Judge Jasen.
42 Justice White's majority opinion was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor. Justice O'Connor filed a concurring opinion. Justice Brennan
also filed an opinion, which Justice Marshall joined, concurring in the judgment. Similarly,
Justice Stevens filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, and Justice Blackmun concurred
without opinion.
43 Ferber, 102 S. Ct. at 3358.

44 Id. at 3355 n.9. After extensive hearings, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary concluded that child pornography participants are often unable to develop healthy personal relationships in adulthood, and that they tend to become sexual abusers themselves. S. REP. No.
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Court concurred in the legislative judgment that "[t]he prevention of
sexual exploitation and abuse of children constitutes a government objective of surpassing importance. ' 4 5 Justice White stressed that the
state's compelling interest in protecting children has justified limitations
on first amendment freedoms in the past, 4 6 citing Prince v. Massachusel s, 4 7 Ginsberg v. New York ,48 and FCCv. Pacjfica Foundation4 9 as examples. The Court's reasoning merely reaffirmed its long-held belief that
"[a] democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy, well50
rounded growth of young people into full maturity as citizens."
After evaluating the state's interest in banning nonobscene depictions of adolescent sexuality and finding that interest compelling, the
Court turned to an examination of the first amendment interests at
stake. The Court decided that these interests were insignificant. First,
the Court held that "[t]he value of permitting live performances and
photographic reproductions of children engaged in lewd sexual conduct
438, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1977). Children are also physically harmed in the production of
sado-masochistic materials, and sometimes even murdered. See Anson, supra note 10, quoted in
Senate Hearings,supra note 10, at 154. In addition, children may suffer other forms of physical
harm because their bodies are not mature enough for sexual activity:
The prepubescent child having sexual intercourse does not have a vaginal pH which
protects against infection. Work in Australia by Dr. Malcom Doppileson, a gynecologist
and Odyessy Board Member, has shown that children who have prepubescent intercourse have the highest incidence of cervical carcinoma of all women at early ages in
their twenties and thirties.
Sexual Exploitation of Children. Hearings before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm. on the
Judiciaqy, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 44 (1977) (statement of Judianne Densen-Gerber, President,
Odyessy Institute) [hereinafter cited as House Crime Hearings]. See also Densen-Gerber, Child
Prostitutionand ChildPornography: Medical, Legal and SocietalAspects of the Commercial Exploitation
of Children, in U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN:
SELECTED READINGS 77, 80 (1980); Ellerstein & Canavan, Sexual Abuse of Boys, 134 AM. J.
DISEASES OF CHILDREN 255, 256-57 (1980); Finch, Adult Seduction of the Child. E ects on the
Child, 7 MED. ASPECTS OF HUM. SEXUALITY 170, 185 (1973); Schoettle, Child Exploitation: A
Study of Child Pornography, 19 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD PSYCH. 289, 296 (1980); Schoettle, Treatment of the Child Pornography Patient, 137 AM. J. PSYCH. 1109, 1110 (1980).
45 Frber, 102 S.Ct. at 3355.
46 See infra notes 117-24 and accompanying text.
47 321 U.S. 158 (1944). In Prince, the Court upheld a child labor law which prohibited
children from selling periodicals in any street or public place. The statute was challenged on
the basis that it prevented a young child who was a Jehovah's Witness from distributing
religious pamphlets. Despite the statute's effect on the freedom of religion, the Court upheld
the law in the interest of protecting children.
48 390 U.S. 629 (1968). In Ginsberg, the Court upheld a statute which prohibited the sale
of sexually explicit literature to minors. While conceding that the material in question was
not obscene as to adults, the Court held the legislature could rationally find that exposure to
such material is harmful to minors.
49 438 U.S. 726 (1978). In Pacifca, the Court found that a radio monologue which dealt
explicitly with four-letter words was not obscene, but was regulable because the government's
interest in protecting children justified limiting indecent but nonobscene broadcasts to hours
when children were not likely to be in the audience.
50 Prince, 321 U.S. at 168.
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is exceedingly modest, if not de minimis."'' s In so holding, the majority
embraced for the first time the notion that the social value of speech is a
consideration in determining what degree of protection should be
awarded that speech. 52 Second, the Court denied that a ban on the
dissemination of nonobscene depictions of adolescent sexuality was
equivalent to "censoring a particular literary theme or portrayal of sexual activity; '53 such depictions still retain first amendment protection as
long as they do not contain a live performance by a minor. 54 Third, the
Court dismissed the claim that section 263.15 is unconstitutionally overbroad. 55 While admitting that under the New York Court of Appeals'
construction 56 the statute could apply to "medical textbooks [and]
pictorials in National Geographic" and that such applications were "arguably impermissible," 57 Justice White denied that the statute was unconstitutionally overbroad because any resultant overbreadth would not
be "substantial." 58 The Court reached this holding by applying the rule
of Broadick v. Oklahoma,5 9 which held that "the overbreadth of a statute
must not only be real, but substantial as well, judged inrelation to the
statute's plainly legitimate sweep," 60 before a statute may be declared
unconstitutionally overbroad. The Court thereby extended the scope of
Broadrick, which had previously applied only in cases "where conduct
and not merely speech is involved,"' 6' to cases like Ferber, which deal
102 S. Ct. at 3357.
Steven's opinion in Young v. American Mini Theatre, 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1975)
held that sexually explicit speech does not receive full first amendment protection because
"few of us would march our sons and daughters off to war to preserve [it]." That section of
his opinion, however, was joined only by Chief Justice Burger and Justices White and Rehnquist. Likewise, the section of Justice Steven's opinion in Pacflea which suggested that sexually explicit speech deserves less than full first amendment protection was joined only by
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist. In Ferber,the Court takes Justice Steven's argument further than he intended: he believes that speech with lesser value, while regulable, is
still protected from total suppression. Id. For a discussion of Justice Steven's concurrence in
Ferber, see notes 92-97 and accompanying text.
53 Ferber, 102 S.Ct. at 3357.
54 Id. at 3357-58.
55 A regulation is overbroad when it punishes speech which it did not have to reach in
order to accomplish the legislature's valid goal. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
51 Ferber,
52 Justice

LAW 710 (1978); Comment, FirstAmendment Overhreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844 (1970).
56 The Court' was bound to accept the construction given the statute by the New York
Court of Appeals. See Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 520 (1972). For the New York
court's construction, see supra note 25 and accompanying text.
57 Ferber, 102 S. Ct. at 3363.

58 Id.

59 413 U.S. 601 (1973). In Broadrick, the Court limited the reach and strength of the
overbreadth doctrine. See Shaman, The First Amendment Rule Against Overbreadth, 52 TEMP.
L.Q. 259, 269 (1979); Yarbrough, The Burger Court and Freedom of Expression, 33 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 37, 39 (1976).
60 Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615.
61

Id. Justice White extended the doctrine by stating-
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62

with pure speech.
Consideration of these three factors convinced the Court that the
infringement on first amendment interests was slight and easily outweighed by the state's interest in protecting children. Therefore, the
Court determined that the state was entitled to "greater leeway in the
regulation of pornographic depictions of children" 63 than it is usually
allowed in cases involving infringements on first amendment freedoms.
Because the Constitution allowed greater leeway in the area of child
pornography, the Court decided to scrutinize the statute less stringently 64 than would be necessary if first amendment interests were
65
involved.
While he admitted that this balancing test had been used to create
a new, unprotected, and content-based 66 classification of speech, Justice
White argued that such a move was not unprecedented:
[I]t is not rare that a content-based classification of speech has been accepted because it may be appropriately generalized that within the confines of the given classification, the evil to be restricted so overwhelmingly
outweighs the expressive interests, if any, at stake, that no process of caseby-case adjudication is required. When a definable class of material, such
as that covered by § 263.15, bears so heavily and pervasively on the welfare of children engaged in its production, we think the balance of competing interests is clearly struck and that it is permissible to consider these
Broadrick was a regulation involving restrictions on political campaign activity, an
area not considered "pure speech," and thus it was unnecessary to consider the proper
overbreadth test when a law arguably reaches traditional forms of expression such as
books and films. As we intimated in Broadrick, the requirement of substantial overbreadth extended "at the very least" to cases involving conduct plus speech. This case,
which poses the question squarely, convinces us that the rationale of Broadrick is sound
and should be applied in the present context ...
Ferber, 102 S.Ct. at 3362.
62 Motion pictures, photographs, illustrations, and plays are all protected by the first
amendment and are considered forms of pure speech. See Schad v. Borough of Mount
Ephriam, 452 U.S. 61, 65 (1981); Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 208; Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153,
155 (1974); Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58, 62 (1970); Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495,
502 (1952).
63 Ferber, 102 S.Ct. at 3354.
64 For a discussion of the standards of scrutiny that are appropriate for analyzing statutes
when first amendment interests are involved, see infra notes 127-31 and accompanying text.
65 Removing child pornography from the first amendment also allowed the Court to sidestep the underinclusiveness problem discussed by the New York Court of Appeals. Since the
Court held that § 263.15 adequately defined an area of unprotected speech subject to content-based regulation, Ferber, 102 S. Ct. at 3359, n.18, "it cannot be underinclusive or unconstitutional for a state to do precisely that." Id.
66 A content-based regulation is one which applies only to speech which deals with a
certain subject matter or advocates a particular viewpoint. An example of a content-based
regulation can be found in Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969). In Street, the Court
struck down a statute making it a crime to cast contempt upon an American flag. This
statute was content-based because it only applied when the speaker expressed a viewpoint
contemptuous of the American flag. See also L. TRIBE, supra note 55 at 584-99.
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67
materials as without the protection of the First Amendment.

Justice White cited libel, 68 obscenity, 69 and fighting words 70 as examples
of content-based classes of speech which have been removed from first
amendment protection by the same process that resulted in the removal
of child pornography.
As a result of the categorical balancing described above, the Court
held that states can ban the distribution of materials described by section 263.15, even when these materials are not legally obscene under the
Miller standard. 71 Because the Court accepted Judge Jasen's assumption 72 that child pornography and obscenity statutes protect different
state interests, 73 it feared the category of obscene material would not
include all depictions of children's sexuality in which production had
involved the sexual abuse of a child. 74 The Court also was concerned
that the prosecutorial burden involved in obtaining an obscenity conviction would preclude adequate enforcement of child pornography laws if
those laws incorporated the Miller guidelines.7 5 Since the Court was
motivated by these fears, and had accepted the legislative judgment that
the harm which accrues from producing depictions of adolescent sexuality greatly outweighs any social value attached to the resulting work, the
Court did not require that the states make exceptions for works of serious value, as it did in Miller. Concern for the possibility that "a work
which, taken on the whole, contains serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value may nevertheless embody the hardest core of child pornography" 76 led the Court to substitute a standard more protective of
children and less protective of first amendment rights than the Miller
guidelines.
Next, the Court explained why the New. York legislature was not
restricted to penalizing only producers of child pornography. According
to the Court, limiting punishment to producers while allowing distribu67 Ferber, 102

68
69
70
71

S. Ct. at 3358.
See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
Ferber, 102 S. Ct. at 3357.

See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
73 Ferber, 102 S. Ct. at 3356-57. This assumption is correct, for child pornography statutes
are designed to protect children from abuse, while obscenity statutes are designed to protect
the moral character of the community, guard against illegal conduct which might be caused
by exposure to obscene literature, and preserve the community from the deteriorating effects
of outlets for adult materials. Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 57-61 (1973). Admitting that this assumption is correct does not imply, however, that the Court's conclusion
that obscenity statutes fail to protect against instances of child abuse is correct. See infra notes
136-42 and accompanying text.
72

74 Ferber, 102 S. Ct. at 3356-57.
75 Id. at 3357, n.12.
76 Id. at 3356-57.

1348

NONOBSCENE CHILD PORNOGRAPHY

[Vol. 73

tors to escape punishment would be an inadequate solution to the child
pornography problem. 77 First, the mechanics of child pornography production are such that it may be impossible to stop the child abuse that
accompanies production by merely regulating producers, for "[t]he most
expeditious if not the only practical method of law enforcement may be
to dry up the market for this material by imposing severe criminal penalties on persons selling, advertising, or otherwise promoting the product."' 78 Second, the distribution of material in and of itself is harmful to

the child. The Court explained that distribution of the material invades
the child's privacy interest 79 and also causes emotional harm because
the child fears later exposure.80 Justice White also employed a third
rationale for regulating distributors: the doctrine that the first amendment does not protect "speech or writing used as an integral part of
conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute.""' Recognizing that the
production of child pornography is illegal throughout the nation, 2 the
Court suggested that the advertising and selling of child pornography is
an "integral part" of its production, because the sale of child pornography provides an economic incentive for the production of such materials.8 3 Therefore, the Court held that, in the context of child
77 Id. at 3356.

78 Id. Finding the producers of child pornography is a very difficult task for law enforcement officials:
The production of child pornography takes little more than a photographer, a child,
a room and an hour; successful dissemination requires an established commercial network and far greater public exposure. Thus, although expensive undercover operations
are necessary to discover, arrest, and convict clandestine producers, much simpler police
procedures can eliminate child pornography ...
Note, supra note 40, at 716.
79 Ferber, 102 S. Ct. at 3355, n.10.
80 Id.

81 Ferber, 102 S. Ct. at 3357 (quoting Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490,
498 (1949)).
82 Id.

83 Id. In claiming that the dissemination of child pornography is an integral part of production merely because dissemination provides an economic motive for production, the Court
greatly stretches the meaning of the word "integral" and misapplies the holding of Giboney.
The Court declared in Giboney that "it has never been deemed an abridgement of freedom of
speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in part
initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language." Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice
Co. 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949). The Ferber Court takes this statement to mean that speech can
be deemed illegal because it is related to conduct which is criminal. That conclusion, however, does not follow. Giboney supports the proposition that the state can punish the child
pornography producer because he is engaged in criminal conduct, regardless of the effect that
this regulation on conduct has on stopping the free flow of literature; but it does not give the
state license to suppress speech in order to deter conduct.
Giboney is not only inapplicable to the facts of Ferber, but is also of doubtful continuing
vitality. For example, in Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), the Court held that the act
of wearing a jacket emblazoned with the legend "Fuck the Draft" could not be punished
under a statute directed at punishing breaches of the peace, in part because the conduct and
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pornography, a state can punish both the distribution and the production of expressive materials in order to reach conduct. The sum of all
these considerations was the Court's holding that "[a]s applied to Paul
Ferber and to others who distribute similar material, the statute does
not violate the First Amendment as applied to the States through the
4
Fourteenth."
Although she joined the majority opinion, Justice O'Connor wrote
a separate concurrence to stress that material containing serious literary,
artistic, scientific, or educational value can be banned if it contains depictions of explicit sexual behavior by minors:
The compelling interests identified in today's opinion. . suggest that the
Constitution might in fact permit New York to ban knowing distribution
of works depicting minors engaged in explicit sexual conduct, regardless of
the social value of the depictions ....
An exception for depictions of serious value, moreover, would actually
for the content-based censorship disfavored by the
increase opportunities
85
First Amendment.

The majority opinion is somewhat ambiguous on the issue of
whether the statute can be constitutionally applied to a work containing
serious value, although the opinion's predominant theme suggests that
serious works are not exempt from the statute. Because the Court held
that works containing depictions of child sexuality need not be considered as a whole,8 6 the first amendment inquiry might be limited to determining whether an offensive picture, viewed in isolation, falls within
the statutory definition of child pornography. If the first amendment
inquiry is limited in this fashion, the value of a work may never be discovered, much less discussed, by courts. Therefore, Justice O'Connor's
assessment that the majority does not plan to exempt works of value
from suppression appears to be accurate.
Justice Brennan, with whom Justice Marshall joined, strenuously
disagreed with the majority and Justice O'Connor on the constitutionality of suppressing works of value. While agreeing that the statute was
properly applied to Paul Ferber, Justice Brennan stated that the application of the statute to any depiction of a child that had serious value
would violate the Constitution, because "the limited classes of speech,
the speech were not separable. Id. at 18. Justice Blackmun, in his dissent, cited Giboney to
support his conclusion that Cohen's conduct could be punished. Id. at 27 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
84 Ferber, 102 S. Ct. at 3363-64 (footnote omitted).

85 Id. at 3364 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor stated that "[a]s drafted, New
York's statute does not attempt to suppress the communication of particular ideas." Id. She
apparently believes that an exception for works of value would allow states to single out works
containing particular viewpoints for suppression.
86 Id. at 3358.
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the suppression of which does not raise serious First Amendment concerns, have two attributes. They are of exceedingly 'slight social value,'
and the State has a compelling interest in their regulation. '8 7 Justice
Brennan argued that because any depiction which in itself is a serious
contribution to literature, art, science or politics is, by definition, not of
slight social value, it cannot be stripped of first amendment protection. 88
Thus, Justice Brennan was not willing to abandon the Miller test: he
would at least retain the component of the test requiring that works be
protected unless, "taken as a whole, [they] do not have serious...
value."

9

According to Justice Brennan, the retention of this component of
the Mi/ler standard would not hamper the state's ability to protect children. He argued that the Court's assumption that children are harmed
whenever they are photographed in lewd poses is not necessarily true
when the children are participating in the production of a serious
work. 90 The state's compelling interest fades as the state turns from
regulation of the "low profile clandestine industry" which produces
purely obscene materials, to the regulation of works of value produced
by legitimate businesses.9 ' Since he was unwilling to make the assumption that all sexual depictions necessarily involve damage to the child
and that any work which contains such a depiction is valueless, Justice
Brennan did not endorse the categorical balancing approach employed
by the majority.
Justice Stevens also wrote a concurrence which agreed that the statute was constitutional as applied to Ferber and criticized the majority
for categorically removing all works containing sexual depictions of children from first amendment protection. 92 He declared that "[t]he question of whether a specific act of communication is protected by the First
Amendment always requires some consideration of both its content and
its context. '93 Indeed, he argued that the first amendment would protect even the films which led to Ferber's conviction, if the films were
shown in a proper setting for a legitimate purpose. 94 Justice Stevens
therefore would also retain the Miller requirement that material be con87 Id. at 3365 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).

88 Id. (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
89 Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
90 Ferber, 102 S. Ct. at 3365 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
91 Id. (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
92 Id. at 3367 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
93 Id. at 3366 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
94 Justice Stevens explained:
[T]he exhibition of these films before a legislative committee studying a proposed
amendment to a state law, or before a group of research scientists studying human behavior, could not, in my opinion, be made a crime. Moreover, it is at least conceivable
that a serious work of art, a documentary on behavioral problems, or a medical or psy-
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sidered as a whole, to ensure that challenged communications will be
examined intheir context, as required by the first amendment.
Contrary to the majority, Justice Stevens reasoned that the first
amendment provides nonobscene depictions of child sexuality with some
marginal degree of protection, but not a degree sufficient to warrant the
use of the overbreadth doctrine to invalidate the statute. 95 By avoiding
overbreadth analysis, he sought to circumvent any discussion of future
applications of the statute, and he criticized the majority for discussing
"the contours of the category of nonobscene child pornography that
New York may legitimately prohibit" in an "abstract setting." 96 Such
speculation about future cases results in an "abstract, advance ruling,"
and Justice Stevens expressed his concern that "[h]ypothetical rulings
are inherently treacherous and prone to lead us into unforeseen errors;
they are qualitatively less reliable than the products of case-by-case
97
adjudication."
Therefore, Justice Stevens did not sanction the categorical prohibition of child pornography advanced by the majority, preferring instead
to leave the decision regarding what is protected to case-by-case adjudication. He believed that a categorical prohibition constitutes substitution of "broad, unambiguous state-imposed censorship for the selfcensorship that an overbroad statute might produce."9 8 He acknowledged that case-by-case adjudication might result in a chilling effect, as
people will be unsure of the reach of the statute. Nevertheless, Justice
Stevens apparently would prefer to chill some sexually explicit speech,
which is of slight value in his eyes, rather than define a rigid category
which could be used to prohibit socially valuable speech.
IV. ANALYSIS
The analysis used by the Court in Ferber is unprecedented, unpersuasive, and shocking in its disregard for the interests underlying our
commitment to free expression. 99 The category of exempted material
chiatric teaching device, might include a scene from one of these films and, when viewed
as a whole in a proper setting, be entitled to constitutional protection.

Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
95 Id. at 3367-68 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Stevens has on several
occasions suggested that sexually explicit speech, while protected by the first amendment,
deserves less protection than other types of speech. See, e.g. , Schad, 452 U.S. at 80 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in the judgment); Pacifta, 438 U.S. at 744-48; Young, 427 U.S. at 69-71.
96 Ferber, 102 S. Ct. at 3367 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
97 Id. at 3367 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
98 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
99 Professor Emerson has grouped the interests protected by our commitment to free expression into four broad categories:
Maintenance of a system of free expression is necessary (1) as assuring individual selffulfillment, (2) as a means of attaining the truth, (3) as a method of securing partici-
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created in Ferber is unlike any other category which has previously been
exempted from first amendment protection. In addition, the means by
which the Court created this category were questionable. Unless the
Court retreats from its analysis in future cases, the protection traditionally afforded to socially valuable speech may be severely curtailed.
In its opinion, the Court attempted to demonstrate that precedent
exists for absolutely denying first amendment protection to any work
which contains a depiction of one of several specified sexual acts involving children. First, the Court explained that it has, on previous occasions, adhered to a two-level analysis of speech 0 0 and has relegated
obscenity, 0 1 libel, 10 2 and fighting words 0 3 to unprotected status, under
the standard set forth in Chaph'nsky v. New Hampshire:
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the
prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any
Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane,
the libelous, and the insulting or "fighting" words-those which by their
very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the
peace. .
ideas ....

.

. [Sluch utterances are no essential part of any exposition of
104

The categories mentioned in Chapinsky differ, however, in two significant ways from the category created in Ferber. First, the Chapinsky
Court justified its treatment of libel, obscenity, and fighting words by
explaining that these classes of speech were outlawed in many states
when the Constitution was ratified, and that the founding fathers had
therefore never intended these modes of expression to be protected by
the first amendment. t 0 5 This historical justification does not apply,
however, to nonobscene depictions of children engaging in sexual bepation by the members of the society in social, including political, decisionmaking, and
(4) as maintaining the balance between stability and change in the society.
Emerson, Toward a General Theo of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L. J. 877, 878-79 (1963).
106 The two-level theory of speech, whereby all speech is either fully protected or not protected at all, has been strong criticized. See Emerson, First Amendment Doctrine and the Burger
Court, 68 CALIF. L. REv. 422, 443-44 (1980); Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity,
1960 Sup. CT. REv. 1. One problem with the two-level analysis first used in ChaplinsA, is that
this analysis does not justify extending protection to speech which only is valuable as a means
of promoting individual self-fulfillment. Emphasis was placed mainly on protecting speech
which has value "as a step to truth." Chap/insky, 315 U.S. at 571-72.
It is curious that the Court relied on this theory in the area of child pornography, for the
theory is being abandoned by the Court in the areas in which it was originally applied. Libel,
for example, was given some constitutional protection in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 269 (1964).
101 Roth, 354 U.S. 476.
102 Beauharnais, 343 U.S. 250.
103 Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. 568.
104 Id. at 571-72.
105 See infra, note 107.
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havior.106 Ferber, therefore, represents the first instance in which a category of speech once sheltered by the first amendment has been stripped
of that protection. 10 7 Second, the classifications mentioned in Chaplinsky
are not absolute. For example, there is no list of words which are always
fighting words;' 0 8 the context and manner in which the words are spoken will be examined before a particular utterance is placed outside of
the first amendment's protective mandate. 0 9 Likewise, there is no list of
specified sexual acts which are always obscene when depicted or described.' 10 Yet, as Justice Stevens recognized, the statute involved in
Ferber consists of an "abstract, advance" list of acts which, in any context, will always constitute unprotected child pornography. tII
Further, the nonabsolute categories of libel, obscenity, and fighting
words have been carefully tailored by the Court to protect socially valu-

able speech. For example, by definition, socially valuable materials cannot be obscene."t 2 The Court has similarly given libelous statements
first amendment protection when such statements are part of a good
faith criticism of a public official, because failure to protect the "errone-

ous statement [which] is inevitable in free debate"' "t

3

would result in

4

self-censorship of valuable criticisms of government."
Likewise, fighting words are protected when they serve the useful purpose of inviting
106 A survey of legislation reveals that nonobscene depictions of children's sexuality were

not illegal in any state before 1974. House Crime Hearings, supra note 44, at 227-34. The federal law aimed at child pornography was not enacted until 1978, and includes an obscenity
provision. 18 U.S.C. § 2552(a) (Supp. IV 1981).
107 The Court does not even attempt to justify the exclusion of nonobscene child pornography on historical grounds. In previous instances in which a category of speech has been
denied first amendment protection, the Court has always discussed the category's historical
exclusion from first amendment protection. See Roth, 354 U.S. at 482-85; Beauhamais, 343
U.S. at 254-58; Chaplinsky 315 U.S. at 571-72.
108 While the Ferber majority stated that it is the content of an utterance that determines
whether it is a fighting word, the Court will not declare an utterance to be unprotected
merely on the basis of its content; the context in which the speech occurs is equally important.
Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 135 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring). For example,
the word "fuck" is sometimes a fighting word, sometimes an obscenity, and sometimes
neither, depending on the context and manner in which the word is used. See Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
109 See Pacifwa 438 U.S. at 746.
110 As the Court held in Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229, 231 (1972) (per curiam), "[a]
reviewing court must, of necessity, look at the context of the material, as well as its content,"
before that material may be deemed obscene.
I I I Ferber, 102 S. Ct. at 3367 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
112 While the definition of what is obscene has changed over the years, the definition has,
for a long time, included a requirement that the work be lacking in value before it may be
declared obscene. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 24; Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 419
(1966); Roth, 354 U.S. at 484.
113 New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271 (1964).
114 Id. at 279.
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dispute' 15 and do not create a "clear and present danger of a serious
substantive evil."', 16 These categorizations all permit the presence of social value to insulate a work from suppression. In Ferber, however, the
Court defines nonobscene child pornography as encompassing any work
which contains a lewd scene involving a child. Following this reasoning,
the question of whether the work has social value is irrelevant in considering whether it can be suppressed. The Ferber majority's failure to acknowledge the importance of context renders the earlier cases on
obscenity, libel, and fighting words inapposite precedents for the Court's
decision to unconditionally strip constitutional protection from nonobscene depictions of child sexuality.
The Court also attempted to find support for the Ferber decision in
previous cases involving regulation of speech in the interest of protecting
children. Although the Court cited these cases as precedent for the
proposition that speech can be stripped of all protection and totally suppressed to protect children, the cited cases can be easily distinguished
because they involved regulation, not the absolute prohibition of speech.
17
to supFor example, the Court cited Young v. American Mini Theatres
port the proposition that "[rjecognizing and classifying child pornography as a category of material outside the protection of the First
Amendment is not incompatible with our earlier decisions." ' 1 8 Young,
however, concerned a zoning ordinance which prohibited adult movie
theatres from concentrating in one area, and while the Court did allow
the ordinance to stand, it stressed that the ordinance merely regulated
the placement of adult theatres within the city: "The situation would
be quite different if the ordinance had the effect of suppressing, or
greatly restricting access to, lawful speech." ' 1 9 Although a plurality of
the Court in Young held that nonobscene but sexually explicit speech
was of lesser value than political expression, the Court stressed that the
speech was protected and that "the First Amendment will not tolerate
the total suppression of erotic materials that have some arguably artistic
0
value." 12
The Court's reliance on FCCv. PacicaFoundation121 to support the
excision of child pornography from the first amendment's protective
115 Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
116 Id.

117 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
118 Ferber, 102 S. Ct. at 3358.
119 Young, 427 U.S. at 71 n.35.
120 Id. ai 70. The Court's attempt to use Young as a precedent in Ferber is especially curious
in light of the Court's discussion in Schad, where the Court explained that Young "did not
purport to approve the total exclusion from the city of theatres showing adult, but not obscene, materials." Schad, 452 U.S. at 76.
121 438 U.S. 726 (1978).

1982]

SUPREME CO UR T RE VIE

1355
135

mandate was similarly flawed. In Pacifca, a George Carlin monologue
satirizing contemporary attitudes toward four-letter words was held to
be subject to regulation because the monologue had been broadcast at a
time when children were likely to be in the listening audience. The
Court emphasized, however, that the value of speech can vary with the
circumstances, and that "this monologue would be protected in other
contexts. 1 22 Thus, while Pacifica is precedent for the proposition that
some words or pictures may be regulated in certain circumstances in the
interest of protecting children, it does not provide support for a complete ban on a particular form of expression. Although the cases cited
by the Ferber Court illustrate that the state's interest in protecting minors has been used to justify statutes which operate in the area of first
amendment freedoms, 23 this interest has never been deemed sufficient
to take the challenged speech out of the protective reach of the first
amendment. 24
In short, the Court's attempt to find precedent for its decision in
Ferber was unsuccessful. Neither the cases involving historical, nonabsolute exclusions from first amendment protection nor the cases involving regulation of sexually explicit speech in order to protect children,
provide precedent for the absolute categorical exclusion created in
Ferber.
The process by which the Court removed the category of child pornography from the realm of constitutional protection is also a curious
one. Although the Court admitted that section 263.15 is a contentbased regulation, it did not subject the regulation to the exacting scrutiny that is usually applied to such regulations. 25 Normally, the Court
will uphold a content-based regulation only if it fits into one of the traditionally excluded categories of speech,' 26 or if the government demon27
strates that the regulation is justified by a compelling state interest
122 Id. at 746.
123 See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
124 When faced with a statute like section 263.15 which totally suppresses speech, the
Court has, in the past, struck it down and required the state to regulate in some less restrictive
manner. See, e.g., Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957). In Butler, the Court declared a
statutV unconstitutional because it banned all books which might be harmful to children.
The books were sexually explicit but not obscene. In striking down the statute, the Court
explained: "We have before us legislation not reasonably restricted to the evil with which it is
said to deal. The incidence of this enactment is to reduce the adult population of Michigan
to reading only what is fit for children." Id. at 383. This was likened to "burning the house
to roast the pig." Id.
125 The Court subjected the regulation to a balancing test. Ferher, 102 S. Ct. at 3358.
126 See supra notes 105 & 107 and accompanying text.
127 See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1977); Elrod v. Burns, 427
U.S. 347, 362 (1976); N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438-39 (1963); Bates v. Little Rock,
361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960); N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama ex. rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 463 (1958);
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939).
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and constitutes the least restrictive means of obtaining the state's goal:
[E]iven though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial,
that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental
personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved. The
in light of less drastic
breadth of legislative abridgment must be viewed
128
means for achieving the same basic purpose.
This type of analysis has been labeled strict scrutiny, and can be contrasted with the lesser level of scrutiny which applies to content-neutral 2 9 statutes which infringe upon first amendment rights. This lesser
level of scrutiny employs a balancing test which finds regulatory choices
130
acceptable as long as they do not unduly restrict communication.
"Unless the inhibition resulting from such a content-neutral abridgement is significant, government need show no more than a rational justi13
fication for its choices."'

In Ferber, the Court admitted that nonobscene sexual depictions of
children did not fall into any traditionally excluded categories of speech,
and began to employ a strict level of scrutiny by examining whether the
state's interest was really compelling. Once the Court found there was
indeed a compelling interest, however, it did not turn to a discussion of
least restrictive alternatives, as strict scrutiny analysis requires. Instead,
the Court declared that the presence of a compelling need and an absence of important first amendment interests on the other side of the
balance placed nonobscene child pornography outside the reach of the
128 Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960). Justice Marshall stated the test in the

Village of Belle Terre v. Borass, 416 U.S. 1, 18 (1974)
following manner in his dissent in,
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted):
And, once it be determined that a burden has been placed upon a constitutional right,
the onus of demonstrating that no less intrusive means will adequately protect the compelling state interest and that the challenged statute is sufficiently narrowly drawn, is
upon the party seeking to justify the burden.
See also Schad, 452 U.S. at 69-69 n.7; Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444
U.S. 620, 637 (1980); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 716-17 (1977); Police Department of
the City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
129 A content-neutral regulation is one which applies to speech regardless of the content of
the speaker's message. An example of a content-neutral regulation can be found in Kovacs v.
Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949). In Kovacs, the Court upheld a regulation banning the use of
loudspeakers in residential zones. This regulation was content-neutral because it applied to
all speech which violated the legislature's objective of keeping neighborhoods quiet, and did
not single out for suppression the communication of information concerning a particular subject matter or expressing a particular viewpoint. See also L. TRIBE, supra note 55, at 584-88.
130 L. TRIBE, supra note 55, at 684. For example, in Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974),
the Court upheld a prison regulation forbidding inmates to conduct press interviews. The
Court found that the regulation was, on its face, a content-neutral attempt to prevent disorder in the prison. Therefore, the Court held that this regulation was constitutional, as long as
this restriction operates in a neutral fashion and as long as alternate channels of commuhication are open to prison inmates. Id. at 827-28. See also Lloyd Corp., Ltd. v. Tanner, 407 U.S.
551 (i972); Kovacs, 336 U.S. 77.
131 L. TRIBE, supira note 55, at 684.
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first amendment, obviating the need to consider whether the statute em32
ployed the least restrictive means available.
What renders the Court's balancing approach so frightening is the
Court's willingness to accept both the legislature's determinations regarding the gravity of the state interest involved and the degree to
33
which that state interest will be served by the challenged statute.
This acceptance skews the balancing in favor of the state interest, because once the Court has accepted the legislature's premises, it is "nearly
inevitable" that the Court will award the balance struck by the legisla34
ture "extreme, almost total, judicial deference."'
In this case, close, independent scrutiny would have revealed that
the state's interest is compelling only with regard to obscene materials.
There is no close nexus between the dangers discussed by the Court and
nonobscene materials; the studies and hearings from which the Court
draws its empirical conclusions135 focused upon obscene child pornography which is produced in a clandestine underground for the sole purpose of appealing to pedophiles. As the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary concluded:
It was the opinion of the experts who testified before the Committee that
virtually all of the materials that are normally considered child pornography are obscene under the current standards ...
In comparison with this blatant pornography, non-obscene
materials
136
that depict children are very few and very inconsequential.
Thus, it appears that Justice Brennan and the New York Court of
132 See supra note 128 and accompanying text. The Court's analytical approach is illogical.
Either nonobscene depictions of adolescent sexuality are protected speech, in which case both
a compelling interest and a less restrictive means analysis must be used, or these depictions
are unprotected, in which case no compelling justification for their suppression need be
discussed.
M, The balancing approach has frequently been criticized for being insufficiently protective of first amendment values, in large part because in applying the approach the Court
often accepts the legislative judgment and does not upset it unless it is "outside the pale of fair
judgment." Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 539-40 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). See also Comment, supra note 55, at 911-18. Indeed, the balancing doctrine has been
called "no doctrine at all but merely a skeleton structure on which to throw any facts, reasons,
or speculations that may be considered relevant. . . . [T]he test is so vague as to yield virtually any result in any case." Emerson, supra note 100, at 451-54. The Court's analysis in
Ferber demonstrates the validity of these observations.
'34 Frantz, The FirstAmendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424, 1444 (1962).
135 As Justice Stevens noted, the Court's "empirical evidence . . . is drawn substantially
from congressional committee reports that ultimately reached the conclusion that a prohibition against obscene child pornography---coupled with sufficiently stiff sanctions-is an adequate response to this social problem." Ferber, 102 S. Ct. at 3366 n.4 (Stevens, J., concurring
in the judgment). The remainder of the Court's empirical evidence was drawn mainly from
studies of the effects of sexual molestation by adults on the child victim. See id at 3355 n.9.
136 S. REP. No. 438, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1977). A similar conclusion was reached by
the House Committee which studied the child pornography problem. "We have viewed
much of this material, and there seems little doubt that they [sic] would be found obscene
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Appeals were correct in their respective assessments: when children are
exploited or harmed in production, the resultant work is virtually always obscene, and will be punishable under applicable obscenity statutes. There is, therefore, no compelling interest to justify banning
nonobscene child pornography, and section 263.15 burdens freedom of
13 7
expression without substantial corresponding benefits.
Apparently, the Court feared that works involving the sexual exploitation of children will not be found obscene under the Miller standard; this fear is unrealistic, however. Even a brief description of child
pornography which has been seized by government officials reveals that
these materials are made solely for the purpose of stimulating sexual
deviants. 13 Further, a theme of sado-masochism pervades a great deal
of the material. 139 It is inconceivable to suggest that juries could find
such depictions inoffensive and socially valuable, 140 or that juries could
believe that such depictions would not appeal to the prurient interest of
the average pedophile. 14 1 Likewise, no evidence has been presented that
under existing federal and state obscenity laws." H. R. REP. No. 696, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 7
(1977).
137 As the legislature has the burden of proof under traditional first amendment principles
to show that it is using the least restrictive means, and the legislature's proof consists of documentation showing only that children are harmed by engaging in obscene performances, the
prohibition of nonobscene depictions of child sexuality also fails the second part of the strict
scrutiny test. See supra note 128. Section 263.10, which prohibits the promotion of obscene
sexual performances involving children, would constitute the least restrictive means of achieving the state's goals. See supra note 18.
138 A list of items normally considered child pornography is contained in Senate Hearings,
supra note 10 at 67. One popular child pornography film entitled "First Communion" was
described by Anson, supra note 10, quoted in Senate Hearings, supra note 10, at 151:
The film shows five eight year-old girls receiving their first communion, perfect innocents in the perfect ceremony of innocence. Suddenly, a motorcycle gang breaks into
the church. . .. [T]he gang pauses to beat up the priest with chains. Then they crucify
him to the cross above the alter. Finally. . .the sex begins. You can actually see the
little girls bleeding. All of them are screaming, except the movie is silent, and you can't
hear their cries.
139 See Senate Hearings, supra note 10, at 67 (testimony of Prof. Frank Osanka).
140 In United States v. Various Articles of Obscene Merchandise, Schedule 1724, 460 F.
Supp. 826 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), District Court Judge Leval held films of boys aged 14-17 engaging in masturbation, oral sex, and anal intercourse to be obscene. In the same case, he found
a magazine depicting an adult man and woman engaging in similar sex acts not obscene.
The Judge's experience has been that "[g]enerally all the items which display photographs of
young children have been found patently offensive within the community standards, excepting those in which the child is not shown to be engaged in sexual activity or lewd display."
Id. at 830. For other examples of convictions of child pornographers under obscenity law, see,
e.g., United States v. Espinoza, 641 F.2d 153 (4th Cir. 1981); United States v. Various Articles
of Obscene Merchandise, Schedule 1769, 600 F.2d 394 (2nd Cir. 1979); United States v. Various Articles of Obscene Merchandise, Schedule 1303, 562 F.2d 185 (2nd Cir. 1977); United
States v. Brown, 328 F.Supp. 196 (E.D. Va. 1971); Raymond Heartless, Inc. v. State, 401
A.2d 921 (Del. Supr. 1979).
141 When sexual material is aimed at a deviant group and the average person would find
the material sickening rather than titilating, the correct standard for determining obscenity is
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the depictions of adolescent sexuality or children's genitals included in
medical texts or major motion pictures present a threat of harm to the
children involved similar to that presented by the clandestine underground which produces obscene materials.1 42 Therefore, an obscenity
statute should adequately protect children from harm.
Another unpersuasive element of the Court's analysis is Justice
White's claim that section 263.15 does not censor any particular viewpoini or portrayal of sexual activity, since ideas concerning teenage sexuality can still be expressed as long as these ideas are not illustrated by
depictions of actual children. 143 This statement ignores Justice Harlan's
admonition in Cohen v. California144 that certain words-or, in Ferber, depictions-may be the only effective manner of conveying a particular
idea,1 45 and that, if allowed to ban certain words, "governments might
soon seize upon the censorship of particular words as a convenient guise
1 46
for banning the expression of unpopular views."
In certain circumstances, a realistic depiction of children's sexuality
may be necessary to communicate certain emotions or concepts, and in
whether the material appeals to the prurient interest of the deviants at which it is directed.
Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 508 (1966).
142 See in/ia note 165 and accompanying text.
143 Ferber, 102 S. Ct. at 3357-58. Justice White suggested that producers could utilize persons over sixteen who look younger when a visual depiction of adolescent sexuality is an
important and necessary part of a literary, scientific, or educational work, and that, therefore,
the first amendment interest "is limited to that of rendering the portrayal somewhat more
"realistic". Id. This alternative will not suffice in all circumstances, however. In some cases,
realism is essential. For example, a medical text on adolescent sexuality cannot depict adults
pretending to be adolescents.
The Court seems to be implying that § 263.15 is merely a reasonable time, place, or
manner restriction. This is not the case, however, since time, place, and manner restrictions
are valid only if they are content-neutral. See Schad, 452 U.S. at 76-77; Southeastern
Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 556 (1975); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405,
411 n. 4 (1974) (per curiam); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115-16 (1972);
Mosley, 408 U.S. 92; Schneider, 308 U.S. at 164.
144 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
145 As the Cohen majority stated:
[M]uch linguistic expression serves a dual communicative function: it conveys not only
ideas capable of relatively precise, detached explication, but otherwise inexpressible emotions as well. In fact, words are often chosen as much for their emotive as their cognitive
force. . ..

[T]hat emotive function.

. .

may often be the more important element of the

overall message sought to be communicated.
403 U.S. at 26.
146 Id. For example, the Guyon Society of California, with approximately 5000 members,
may find that this ruling interferes with their political advocacy. The Guyons believe that
the ideal world is one in which there is no sexual guilt. Claiming that children form their
attitudes toward sex around age eight, they have adopted the slogan "Sex before eight or else
its too late!" The society works to change laws and attitudes concerning statutory rape and
other sex crimes, by presenting documentary presentations at college campuses and on television. Sexual Exploitation of Children: Hearings before the Subcora. on Select Education of the House

Comm. on Education and Labor, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 167 (1977) (testimony of Tim O'Hara,
President, Guyon Society).
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such circumstances, the Court's ruling in Ferber has effectively suppressed such communication. 147 As the New York Court of Appeals correctly explained, pediatrics texts, documentaries explaining the sexual
customs of other cultures, and presentations by anti-child pornography
groups which include illustrations of the materials which they oppose
could be suppressed under section 263.15.148 Therefore, the Court's creation of an absolute exclusion to the first amendment's protective mandate is a form of censorship.
Another, more subtle form of censorship will arise from the Court's
decision to extend the Broadrick ruling to statutes regulating pure
speech. 149 This extension enabled the Court to employ a balancing test
in measuring overbreadth, and to dismiss Ferber's challenge that the
statute was overbroad. Consequently, the statute remains on the books,
and producers, publishers, and distributors of valuable material which
might be covered by section 263.15 will be deterred from releasing such
material in the marketplace for fear of prosecution. 50
While litigants traditionally have not been granted standing to
challenge a statute on the grounds that it might be unconstitutionally
applied to others in situations not before the Court, 15 1 when first amendment interests are at stake, the Court has generally granted such standing. 152 Such challenges have been permitted even when the defendant's
conduct was clearly covered by the law and not within the ambit of the
first amendment, 53 because of the judicial prediction that the very
existence of an overbroad statute may cause a chilling effect on parties
not before the Court, 154 and because of the preferred status of first
55
amendment rights.'
See supra note 143.
Ferber, 52 N.Y.2d at 678, 422 N.E.2d at 525, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 865.
149 See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
150 See infia notes 154 & 159-63 and accompanying text.
151 Broadick, 413 U.S. at 610.
152 See, e.g., Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
153 Justice Brennan explained in N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432 (1963):
[T]he instant decree may be invalid if it prohibits privileged exercises of first amendment
rights whether or not the record discloses that the petitioner has engaged in privileged
conduct. For in appraising a statute's inhibitory effect upon such rights, this Court has
not hesitated to take into account possible applications of the statute in other factual
contexts besides that at bar.
154 Professor Schauer explains that a chilling effect "occurs when individuals seeking to
engage in activity protected by the first amendment are deterred from so doing by government regulation not specifically directed at that protected activity." Schauer, Fear,Risk, and
the First Amendment: Unraveling the "Chilling Eect," 58 BOsT. U.L. REv. 685, 693 (1978) (emphasis omitted). A chilling effect will most likely occur when an individual wants to engage
in expression which falls close to the line separating protected and unprotected speech. If the
individual fears that his "marginal" conduct will be judged illegal, he is likely to engage in
self-censorship. Id. at 696.
155 See McKay, The Preferencefor Freedom, 34 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1182, 1184 (1959).
147

148
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In its original form, overbreadth analysis was not a balancing process. Overbroad statutes were invalidated even if the interests they promoted outweighed the corresponding damage to first amendment
rights.' 5 6 In Broadrick, however, the Court held that when a statute
which is aimed at conduct is challenged because of its incidental effect
on speech, it can be upheld even if it can be applied overbroadly in a
large number of cases, provided that these impermissible applications
are insubstantial when compared with the statute's legitimate applications.' 57 This change in the overbreadth doctrine reflects the Burger
Court's skepticism that any chilling effect will result from an overbroad
statute. 158
Until Ferber, the Broadrick ruling was not applied to traditional
forms of expression, such as films and books. The Court's decision to
extend Broadrick's scope when confronted with New York Penal Law section 263.15 is puzzling, for this law had already caused a documented
chilling effect, and had, therefore, been declared unconstitutional by another court. In St. Martins Press, Inc. v. Care,' 59 the publishers of the
children's sex education book Show Mete6 sought injunctive and declaratory relief against section 263.15. The district court found that in 1977,
when the statute was adopted, New York booksellers refused to carry or
sell the book, fearing prosecution. 6 1 The court further held that Show
Me was not obscene, although it did fall within the purview of section
263.15 because "at least one of the photographs meets the statutory definition of sexual conduct."' 162 Since the plaintiffs would have been risking
a prison term of up to seven years if they distributed the book, "they
effectively were forced to cease publication and sale of Show Me! The
consequence of their decision is the irretrievable loss of the first amend63
ment rights of the authors, booksellers, and readers."'
When an educational or medical book like Show Me! is challenged
in court in the wake of Ferber, the constitutional inquiry will be limited
to determining whether the book contains one depiction which is prohibited by section 263.15. If it does, the book will be deemed outside the
protective sphere of the first amendment, regardless of the social value of
156 See, e.g., United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 268 n.20 (1967).
157 Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615.
158 See L. TRIBE, supra note 55, at 713.

159 440 F. Supp. 1196 (1977), rev'd on other grounds, 605 F.2d 41 (2d Cir. 1979).
160 McBRIDE & FLEISCHHAUER-HARDT, SHOW ME! (1975).
161 St. Martin's Press, 440 F. Supp. at 1203.
162 Id. at 1201.

Id. at 1203. After the Ferber decision was handed down, St. Martin's Press stopped
distribution of Show Me! within the United States. Chi. Sun-Times, Sept. 20, 1982, at 18, col.
1.
163
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the work as a whole, and its authors, publishers and distributors will be
subject to prosecution.
The Ferber decision will create a similar chilling effect in the entertainment industry. For example, the popular film The Exorcist could
be banned and the various people involved in its production and sale
could be prosecuted, because actress Linda Blair, a minor at the time
the film was produced, simulated masturbation with a crucifix in the
movie.1 64 Prosecuting this film would serve no governmental purpose;
Ms. Blair was not physically molested or emotionally damaged due to
the fact that the film is being viewed by others.t 6 5 Yet the Court's ruling
in Ferber guarantees that future filmmakers will be wary of producing
any film the script of which calls for a minor to engage in actual or
simulated sexual activity.
The Court's extension of Broadrick enabled Justice White to claim
that these examples of the suppression of first amendment freedoms are
insignificant when compared with the legitimate sweep of section
263.15, and that therefore the statute is not overbroad. Even under
Broadrick, however, this statute is clearly overbroad. As noted above, the
statute's legitimate applications are, according to the Senate Judiciary
Committee, very few and insubstantial. 6 6 On the other side of the
equation the statute will chill or restrain pediatrics texts, sex education
books, documentaries on the sexual abuse of children and on the sexual
habits of children in other cultures, as well as films and plays having a
great deal of entertainment value for the average audience. Even under
the Court's balancing equation, section 263.15 should be declared invalid on its face due to unconstitutional overbreadth.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Court's decision in Ferber categorically to exclude all works
which depict sexual conduct or the lewd exhibition of genitals by children from first amendment protection is insufficiently protective of first
amendment freedoms, unnecessary to protect children, and unsound.
After Ferber, courts making or reviewing child pornography decisions
can constitutionally suppress a work on the basis of an examination of
its objectionable depictions in isolation. Any work which contains a depiction which falls within a statutory definition of child pornography
164
165

S. REP. No. 438, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1977).
Senate Hearings, supra note 10, at 108 (statement of Prof. Paul Bender):

[A] child acting in a film like "The Exorcist". . . [is not a victim of] child abuse of the
sort that I think you are mostly worried about. . .[Tlhat takes place in a more or less
open situation with a well established business. There are parents or guardians who are
looking after their child's best interest.
166 See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
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may be suppressed, even if the work as a whole is not obscene, and even
if the work contains substantial literary, artistic, social, or political
value.
To create this extraordinarily broad exclusion, the Court misused
precedent and failed to subject the challenged statute to the exacting
scrutiny required by the first amendment in cases of content-based regulations. Because the Court neglected to inquire whether a less restrictive
means of serving the state's interest in protecting children exists, it upheld an overbroad statute. Furthermore, the Court's skepticism over
chilling effects, manifested in its extension of the Broadrick doctrine to
cases dealing with pure speech, is particularly inappropriate in this case
because the New York statute has already caused a documented chilling
effect. The Court's decision can only foster more self-censorship.
The most ominious aspect of the Court's ruling is its willingness to
abandon the Miller obscenity standard, which requires a court to examine a work as a whole and save it from suppression if it contains social
value. As explained by Justices Brennan and Stevens, t67 this standard is
mandated by the first amendment. Hopefully, when officials use statutes such as section 263.15 to prosecute the producers or distributors of a
book or film of some value, the Court will retreat from Ferber and incorporate the Miller standard into the definition of child pornography. The
Court must not abandon the Miller standard, for if it were to regard as
sound constitution procedure the censorship of material based on the
isolated viewing of an offensive scene, the implications for mass censor68
ship would be staggering.1
167 Ferber, 102 S. Ct. at 3365 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment); Id. at 3366 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
168 This could signal a return to the Regina v. Hicklin, 3 L.R.-Q.B. 360 (1868) standard
that was popular with early American courts. Under Hicklin, the obscenity of the work as a
whole was judged by the effect of isolated passages upon the most susceptible members of
society. Theodore Dreiser's AN AMERICAN TRAGEDY and D.H. Lawrence's LADY CHATrERLY'S LOVER were among the works declared obscene under this standard. See Commonwealth v. Friede, 271 Mass. 318, 171 N.E. 472 (1930); Commonwealth v. DeLacey, 271 Mass.
327, 171 N.E. 455 (1930).
That some courts would welcome an opportunity to disregard the value of the work as a
whole was vividly illustrated in Salt Lake City v. Pipenburg, 571 P.2d 1299 (Utah 1977). In
that case, Chief Justice Ellet of the Utah Supreme Court upheld an obscenity conviction,
stating.
A more sickening, disgusting, depraved showing cannot be imagined. However, certain justices of the Supreme Court of the United States have said that before a matter
can be held to be obscene, it must ". . .when taken as a whole, lacks [sic] serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value."
Some state judges, acting the part of sycophants, echo that doctrine. It would appear that such an argument ought only to be advanced by depraved, mentally deficient,
mind-warped queers. Judges who seek to find technical excuses to permit such pictures
to be shown under the pretense of finding some intrinsic value to it are reminiscent of a
dog that returns to his vomit in search ofsome morsel in the filth which may have some
redeeming value to his own taste.
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An absolute categorical exclusion such as that created in Ferber has
never before been permitted, and for excellent reasons. If this nation is
seriously committed to preserving first amendment freedoms, it must allow no departure from the long-standing principle that "in the area of
freedom of speech and press the courts must always remain sensitive to
any infringement on genuinely serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific expression." 169 In order to detect such infringements, the Court
must use sensitive tools. 170

As Justices Stevens and Brennan pointed

Out, 17 1

however, an absolute categorization is not a sensitive tool; it is a
blunt instrument. It renders the Court blind to any serious value which
a work might contain.
The sexual exploitation of children in obscene publications and
films is deplorable and shocking, and any discussion of the subject is
likely to be characterized by the extreme emotionalism that prompted
one witness in the House hearings to exclaim that "if I had to give up a
portion of my First Amendment rights to stop this stuff, then I'd be
willing to do it. ' ' 172 In Ferber, the Supreme Court implicitly echoed this
cry, and upheld a statute which infringes upon protected speech, even
though children could be protected under a less restrictive statute incorporating an obscenity standard. The Ferber decision may protect children; it fails to protect the first amendment.
SANDRA ZUNKER BROWN

Id. at 1299-1300.
169 Miller, 413 U.S. at 22-23.
170 See Spezser, 357 U.S. at 527.
171 Ferber, 102 S. Ct. at 3365 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 3366 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
172 House Crime Hearings,supra note 44, at 41 (statement of Judianne Densen-Gerber, President, Odyessy Institute).

